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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHNNY HARRIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020025-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-2(3)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
To establish the crime of possessing a stolen vehicle, the State must prove, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that a person possessed a vehicle while knowing or having reason to 
know the car was stolen. Here, the State's case rested on a police officer's unreliable 
identification and the testimony of a 14-year old boy who repeatedly lied, admitted that 
he sought favorable treatment for his cooperation, and gave conflicting and incredible 
reports about his actions. Did the State establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt? 
In reviewing cases for sufficient evidence, this Court affords great deference to the 
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jury verdict and will only reverse a conviction when reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. State v. Goddard, 
871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). Trial counsel preserved this issue by requesting the trial 
judge to dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence following the presentation of the 
State's case (R. 100: 66-67). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISION 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-la-1316(2) 
It is a second degree felony for a person: 
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to believe has been 
stolen or unlawfully taken if he is not a peace officer engaged at 
the time in the performance of his duty. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Johnny Harris appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Third 
District Court after a conviction by a jury of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a 
second degree felony. 
B. ^Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Johnny Harris was charged by information filed in Third District Court on August 
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29, 2001, with one count of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-la-1316(2) (R. 3). After Harris waived the 
preliminary hearing, the trial court bound the case over for trial (R. 28). The trial court 
convened a jury trial on November 13, 2001 (R. 41). The jury found Harris guilty (R. 
75). 
On December 21, 2001, the trial court imposed a prison term of one to 15 years, 
suspended the term, and ordered Harris to serve one year in the county jail (R. 79-81). 
The trial court also placed Harris on probation for 24 months and ordered him to pay 
$500 toward the costs of his court-appointed attorney plus a fine of $1844.05 (R. 79-80). 
Harris filed a timely notice of appeal in Third District Court on January 10, 2002 (R. 83). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On August 25, 2001, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Salt Lake City Police Officer 
David Malley was transporting a person to jail in his patrol car (R. 100: 21). While 
Officer Malley was driving westbound on 300 South near West Temple Street, he saw a 
green Kia swerve to miss another car and he noticed that the car had its headlights off (R. 
100: 22). Officer Malley activated his emergency lights and tried to pull the car over (R. 
100: 22). The car continued, however, westbound and turned north into an alley at 150 
West (R. 100: 22). The car came to a stop in a parking lot at 200 West and Pierpont 
Avenue which lies at 240 South (R. 100: 22, 31). 
As the car came to an abrupt stop, all four car doors swung open and four people 
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exited the car, one from each door (R. 100: 22-23). The two occupants on the driver's 
side of the car fled toward the west (R. 100: 25). The person sitting on the rear passenger 
side ran northward while the person in the front passenger seat stopped at the scene (R. 
100: 25). 
Officer Malley drew his firearm, detained the remaining suspect at gunpoint, and 
radioed a description of the other three suspects to police dispatch (R. 100: 26). He 
described the suspects as Polynesian or Asian (R. 100: 27). The driver was wearing a 
white shirt while the suspect sitting in the back who fled with the driver wore a gray shirt 
(R. 100: 27). Officer Malley checked the car's license plate and vehicle identification 
numbers and discovered that the car was stolen (R. 100: 26). 
Police Officer Steve Cutler heard the radio report while he was traveling on 300 
West (R. 100: 48). As he drove northbound on 300 West he saw two males with lighted-
colored shirts walking togther near 185 South (R. 100: 48-49). Officer Cutler stopped 
18-year old Harris, and 14-year old Andy Rasabout (R. 100: 10,13-14,49). Both young 
men were breathing hard and were sweating on their faces, although Andy was sweating 
more prominently (R. 100:49-50). That evening was a warm summer night (R. 100: 36). 
When back-up officers arrived, Officer Cutler separated the two young men and he 
interviewed Harris (R. 100: 49-50). Harris informed Officer Cutler that he was walking 
to his mother's house (R. 100: 50). He denied any involvement with the stolen car (R. 
100: 30). Instead, Harris stated that while he was walking down the street, Andy, a friend 
of his, came up to him and they walked together (R. 100: 50). Although Harris was 
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familiar with Andy, he did not know Andy's name (R. 100: 53-54). 
In contrast, Andy informed the police that he did not know Harris, at all (R. 100: 
37-38, 54). Although the record is not clear, Officer Malley indicated that Andy may 
have mentioned something about being at a Carl's Jr. restaurant earlier in the evening (R. 
100: 35). More specifically, however, Andy alleged that he had been at the mall and had 
asked the three other males who had been in the car, including Harris, for a ride (R. 100: 
54). He claimed further that Harris drove the car (R. 100: 37-38). 
The police discovered that the person who Officer Malley apprehended with the 
car was named Jason Pervis (R. 100: 40). Andy identified the other person who fled as 
his friend Shawn Garfield (R. 100: 14, 40-41). Both Jason and Shawn were^older than 
Andy but the record does not provide their ages (R. 100: 14-15). At the scene, Andy 
denied knowing Jason (R. 100: 45). The police later determined that Jason and Shawn 
lived on the same street in Murray (R. 100: 42). 
Officer Malley traveled to where the police were detaining Harris and Andy (R. 
100: 28). He immediately identified Andy as the person who fled from the rear seat on 
the driver's side of the car (R. 100: 28). He was certain of this identification because 
Andy had hesitated a few seconds before fleeing which gave the officer "a much better 
look at [Andy] than the others who ran" (R. 100: 25-26, 29, 37). Because Officer Malley 
did not get as good a look at the driver of the car, he stated that he was only 80 to 85 
percent sure that Harris was the driver (R. 100: 29). Officer Malley also brought Jason to 
the arrest scene to try to identify the two males being held but Jason did not identify 
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Harris as being in the car (R. 100: 40). 
The police discovered that the car was stolen from a used car dealership in Murray 
(R. 100: 32, 57-58). Apparently, someone had obtained the keys to the car in the 
dealership office without the dealership's knowledge (R. 100: 63-64). The police did not 
search the car for fingerprints or find any other evidence to link the car to anyone (R. 
100: 33-35, 52-53). 
The police filed no charges against Jason or Shawn (R. 100: 42). Although ,<\ndy 
was originally charged in the incident, the police later released him and dropped the 
charges (R. 100:17,42). 
At trial, Andy testified that on the night of the incident, he was at the Carl's Jr. 
restaurant at 200 South and State Street with his "friends" Jason and Shawn (R. 100: 11, 
16). According to Andy, Jason knew Harris and recognized him at the restaurant (R. 100: 
12). Andy denied knowing Harris (R. 100: 12). Jason asked Harris to give the three 
friends a ride to the Trax station where they planned to take Trax home to Murray where 
Jason and Shawn lived and Midvale where Andy lived (R. 100: 12,15-16,41-42). 
Andy initially asserted that the four males drove for 15 minutes to 300 West but 
admitted on cross-examination that it would not take that long to drive such a short 
distance (R. 100: 16). Andy stated that the four passengers fled because Harris told them 
that the car was stolen as the police were pulling over the car (R. 100: 12-13,17). He 
claimed that he ran with Harris for five minutes until the police apprehended them (R. 
100: 13). 
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On cross-examination, Andy claimed that he could not remember informing the 
police that he did not know Jason (R. 100: 18). But, after reviewing the police report, 
Andy admitted that he had lied to police about his friendship with Jason (R. 100: 19). 
After acknowledging that the police detained him only a block or two away from the car, 
Andy conceded that he had overstated the length of time that he had run with Harris (R. 
100: 18). Finally, Andy admitted that he lied to police about knowing Jason because he 
wanted to keep himself and his friends "out of trouble" (R. 100: 19). 
The jury convicted Harris of receiving a stolen vehicle (R. 100: 103-04). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State failed to present sufficient evidence upon which to convict Harris 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Andy lacked credibility given his lies to the police about 
knowing Jason, his implausible story about requesting a car ride to a transit station a 
block away, and his motivation to exculpate himself and his friends. The only other 
evidence supporting the conviction was Officer Malley's 80 to 85-percent identification 
of Harris. But, Officer Malley's identification was unreliable given the minimal 
opportunity he had to view the driver, his focus on Andy's hesitation, the distraction of 
seeing four suspects exiting a car and fleeing while he brandished his gun, and the 
chaotic, uncertain nature of the situation. Because the remaining evidence supported 
Harris's innocence and the State presented no other evidence to link Harris to the crime, 
the jury could not have reasonably convicted Harris. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH A CRIME BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT GIVEN THE STATE'S KEY WITNESS'S MULTIPLE 
LIES, HIS IMPLAUSIBLE AND CONTRADICTORY STORY, AND THE 
UNRELIABLE IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY 
The State presented no competent evidence to establish proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Harris had any connection to the stolen vehicle. Andy completely lacked 
credibility because he repeatedly lied, told an unbelievable story, and had significant 
motives to absolve himself and his friends of criminal liability. Moreover, the only other 
evidence linking Harris to the car was Officer Malley's brief view of the driver during a 
very chaotic, tense situation. Given the inadequacy of the evidence, no reasonable juror 
could have found Harris guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court "view[s] the evidence and 
the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict 
and assumefs] that the jury believed the evidence and inferences that support the verdict." 
State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds in State v. 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 n.2 (Utah 1996). "To demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient to support [a] jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 
1[14, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 
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1991)). Reversal is required "when the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable" that reasonable persons must have entertained a reasonable doubt about the 
defendant's guilt. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). 
The marshaled evidence supporting the jury's verdict consisted mainly of Andy's 
and Officer Malley's identifications. Additionally, Harris generally matched the 
description of the driver as wearing a white shirt and he apparently had a dark 
complexion similar to a Polynesian or Asian person. He also had some perspiration on 
his forehead and he was out of breath on a warm summer evening. Finally, he was 
detained near the scene of the crime shortly after the crime occurred and he was walking 
with a participant who had fled the crime scene. 
Despite these facts, numerous weaknesses in the evidence and severe credibility 
problems discredit the reasonableness of the jury's verdict. Most prominently, Andy 
completely lacked credibility. He lied to the police about knowing Jason. Then, he 
claimed at trial that he couldn't remember lying. He only admitted that he falsely told the 
police that he did not know Jason after defense counsel showed him the police report. 
Andy offered further conflicting stories about where he met Harris. Although he 
may have mentioned something about a Carl's Jr. restaurant to the police, Andy informed 
the police that he met Harris and the two older males at a mall and asked them for a ride. 
Andy radically changed his story at trial and claimed that he was with his friends, Jason 
and Shawn, at the Carl's Jr. when Jason recognized Harris. Andy then claimed that 
Jason, rather than he, asked Harris for a ride to the Trax station. 
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Andy's trial testimony was also implausible. He did not explain why he and his 
two friends would ask for a car ride to the Trax station when the nearest station was only 
one block away on Main Street from the Carl's Jr. on State Street Further, when Officer 
Malley observed the green Kia on West Temple, the car was traveling westbound away 
from the Trax line. Andy also appeared to drastically exaggerate the length of time he 
was in the car and how long he ran from police. 
Andy's self-confessed motives to lie further render his testimony unreliable. 
When the police investigate a person for possible involvement in criminal activity v/ith 
another, that person has "'strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate 
himself [or herself].'" Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) (quoting Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968)). As this Court has ruled "statements made in an 
obvious attempt to curry favor with the authorities by inculpating defendant and 
exculpating declarant, lack trustworthiness." State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah 
App. 1990) (fn. omitted). 
Andy had particular incentive to lie, both at the scene and at trial, to please his 
older friends and to protect himself from retribution. At the time of the incident, ,\ndy 
was only 14 years old and Jason and Shawn were older. Given this age difference, Andy 
may have had "'strong motivation'" to protect his older friends to retain favor with them 
and possibly to protect himself from the older boys harming him. Lee, 476 U.S. at 541 
(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 141). Andy specifically admitted at trial that his main 
interests were keeping himself and his friends "out of trouble" (R. 100: 19). By pinning 
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the crime on Harris, who Andy claimed was a stranger, Andy avoided criminal liability 
for himself and he kept his friends from even being charged with a crime. Andy's history 
of lying is also consistent with him making up a story to escape criminal liability and to 
assist his older friends. 
Andy's credibility also suffered because the State dropped the charges against him. 
Testimony given in exchange for favorable treatment by the prosecution is a 
"prototypical" form of bias that casts serious doubt on the credibility of a witness. 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 
308, 318 (1974) (juvenile's probation status impeached his credibility); State v. Chesnut, 
621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980) (defense must be allowed to exposed witnesses' 
potential favorable treatment). By testifying for the State, Andy appears to have secured 
no criminal consequences for being in a stolen car and fleeing from police. 
Given Andy's severe credibility problems, no reasonable juror could rely on his 
testimony to convict Harris. Goddard, 871 P.2d at 543. As the prosecutor conceded 
during closing arguments, the key witness for the State was Andy (R. 100: 99). Because 
he lacked credibility, the State's case failed. 
The only other evidence supporting the jury's verdict was Officer's Malley's 
identification. But, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the "inherent 
deficiencies in eyewitness identification." State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, f42,27 P.3d 
1133. See also State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32,1f27, 984 P.2d 376 ("research has 
convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification"). Of 
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most importance to this case, extensive research has documented that "the confidence 
with which an individual makes an identification is [not] a valid indicator of the accuracy 
of the recollection" and can even be inversely related to reliability. State v. Long, 721 
P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986). See also State v. Hoffliine, 2001 UT 4, f 16, 20 P.3d 265. 
Thus, Officer Malley's claim that he was 80 to 85 percent sure that Harris was the driver 
has little relevance to the accuracy of his tentative identification. 
Further, Officer Malley's weak testimony failed to establish proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Harris drove the stolen car. Courts consider several factors in 
determining the reliability of an eyewitness identification: 
"(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during 
the event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the 
time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, 
including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and 
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and 
relate it correctly. This last area includes such factors as 
whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the 
observer during the time it was observed, and whether the race 
of the actor was the same as the observer's." 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). 
These factors undermine the reliability of Officer Malley's identification. Officer 
Malley admitted that he "got a much better look at [Andy] than the others who ran" (R. 
100: 26). Officer Malley's degree of attention was also reduced because he had four 
different people to view during a brief moment as he was drawing his weapon, detaining 
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Jason at gunpoint, and observing the other three suspects running in different directions. 
The fact that Officer Malley noticed Andy hesitate indicates further that his attention was 
focused on Andy rather than the driver. It should also be noted that Officer Malley may 
have been further distracted because he had a suspect sitting in his patrol car who 
obviously could have attempted to flee. 
Officer Malley's capacity to observe the driver was also limited by the excitement, 
nervousness, and confusion of four young males fleeing from the police in a car chase 
and then scattering on foot. His observations also occurred after dark at 9:30 p.m. And, 
although the event may have been memorable, Officer Malley's heightened nervousness 
and tension at the sight of four young males fleeing from a car in different directions 
would have diminished his capacity to encode the driver's face into memory based on one 
brief glimpse of him. 
Given the significant problems with Office Malkyis identification^&e^a&e**able 
juror could have relied on that evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Harris was the driver. Likewise, Andy's unreliable and-even false testimony faifc-ttr 
establish a reasonable basis for the jury to convict Harris. Because there was no physical 
evidence linking Harris to the crime, the State's evidence only showed that Harris was 
near the scene of a crime and that he matched the general description of the driver. 
This Court has indicated that a person who simply matches the description of a 
suspect does not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In State v Dahlquist, 931 
P.2d 862, 867 (Utah App. 1997), this Court ruled that the trial court erred in refusing to 
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suppress an involuntary confession. This Court then addressed whether the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based the remaining evidence. Id. In doing so, this 
Court ruled that although a witness indicated that the defendant matched the general 
description of the suspect, that evidence alone was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 868. 
This case is similar. Although Dahlquist applied a rigorous harmlessness-beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt test, the same result follows here where the only competent evidence 
linking Harris to the crime was his presence near the scene of a crime and the fact that he 
generally matched the description of a suspect. If anything, the remaining evidence 
supports Harris's innocence. First, Jason did not identify Harris as being in the car. 
Second, the car was taken from a car dealership in Murray near where Andy, Jason, and 
Shawn lived. The State presented no evidence of Harris's residence nor could the State 
link Harris to the theft of the car in any way. Excluding Andy's and Officer Malley's 
unreliable identifications, the jury lacked sufficient evidence upon which it could have 
reasonably based a guilty verdict. Goddard, 87i P.2d at 543. 
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CONCLUSION 
Harris respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for lack of 
sufficient evidence. 
SUBMITTED this 12th day of November, 2002. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
•^Mf-
PATRICK V. LINDSAY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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